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Abstract. We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an
urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits
their intended destination and is assigned a route to follow that mini-
mizes the social cost (i.e., travel distance of all the drivers). We assume
drivers are strategic and try to manipulate the system (i.e., misreport
their intended destination and/or deviate from the assigned route) if
they can reduce their travel distance by doing so. Such strategic behav-
ior is highly undesirable as it can lead to an overall suboptimal traffic
assignment and cause congestion. To alleviate this problem, we develop
moneyless mechanisms that are resilient to manipulation by the agents
and offer provable approximation guarantees on the social cost obtained
by the solution. We then empirically test the mechanisms studied in the
paper, showing that they can be effectively used in practice in order to
compute manipulation resistant traffic allocations.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the development of efficient
traffic control systems [20,16,10]. This is motivated by the significant negative
impact on the quality of life of both road users and residents caused by heavy
traffic congestion levels in large cities such as London, Beijing, and Los Angeles.
Indeed, heavy congestion is known to be a major cause of air and noise pollu-
tion, which are widely recognized as the main cause of many health issues [15,24].
Adding to this is the economic cost associated with the large amount of time
spent in traffic jams, which reduces the productivity of the economy [14]. More-
over, the situation is expected to become significantly worse in the future when
the population, and thus the traffic flow, in large cities will be much bigger
than at present. Unfortunately, conventional traffic control systems have proven
unable to efficiently decrease congestion levels, as they are not designed to be
adaptive to the dynamics of city traffic, which changes over space and time. On
the other hand, it has been shown [22,17] that by putting some sort of intel-
ligence/smartness into traffic control systems, we can make them adapt to the
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changes of the traffic flow. A key objective within these smart traffic control
systems is to address the so-called traffic assignment problem (TAP), in which
mobile agents (i.e., typically drivers) declare their intended destination to the
system, perhaps via their satellite navigation systems, and are then assigned a
route to follow, in such a way that some objective function of the overall traffic
flow in the system is optimized (i.e., minimizing the total traveled distance or
maintaining an efficient traffic load balance). As these agents are typically self-
interested and strategic (i.e., they try to maximize their own utility, disregarding
whether this is detrimental to the global optimization goal), they may manip-
ulate the system whenever they can benefit from doing so [17,26]. This kind of
opportunistic behavior is highly undesirable as it will increase the total social
cost (i.e., decreasing the total load balance or increasing the total congestion
level). As such, incentivizing agents not to be strategic is a key design objective
of these traffic assignment systems [22,17,26]. Given this, we focus on strate-
gyproof TAP mechanisms, which guarantee that it is in the agent’s best interest
to always report her true destination and follow the assigned route. Further-
more, we assume that money transfers between the mechanism and the agents
are not available. This is a common assumption in many domains [21] that will
facilitate the likely real-world deployment of the system by lowering set up costs
(i.e., avoiding the construction of tolling booths).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
related works. In Section 3 we introduce our model for TAP and prove that
Pareto optimal allocations theoretically guarantee that agents will follow their
assigned paths (Theorem 1). We then move to study deterministic (Section 4)
and randomized (Section 5) Pareto optimal mechanisms for our problem. We
show that the approximation ratio of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms
is lower bounded by 3 (Theorem 11), while the Serial Dictatorship mechanism
can achieve an upper bound of 2n − 1 and it is Pareto-optimal and non-bossy
(Theorems 4 and 5), where n is the number of agents (Theorems 4 and 5).
Furthermore, if we require non-bossiness and Pareto optimality, we are able to
close this approximation ratio gap by showing that the Bipolar Serial Dictator-
ship mechanism is the only strategyproof mechanism. For randomized mecha-
nisms, we show that the approximation ratio is lower bounded by 1110 (Theorem
7). In addition, the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism can achieve an n-
approximation (Theorems 8 and 9), while still preserving the desired properties
of Pareto-optimality and non-bossyness. In addition to these theoretical results,
we present an extensive experimental evaluation on traffic networks generated
from real road network data, which show how the mechanisms studied in the
paper provide good performance in practice, despite the high theoretical worst
case approximation guarantee.
Full proofs and definitions can be found in the Appendix.
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2 Related Work
There is a large body of literature on traffic network modelling and assign-
ment [3,23,8,9]. However, these works typically ignore the strategic behaviour of
participating agents. Nevertheless, they can be useful to model the underlying
traffic network in our work. In particular, we follow the widely used traffic model
proposed in [3].
To tackle the strategic behaviour of the agents, several researchers have sug-
gested employing mechanism design with money and auction theory for traf-
fic control [22,17,26,5]. These works typically rely on the computation of the
VCG auction in order to assign vehicles to paths. However, they require mone-
tary incentives, and typically focus on a local control level, such as intersection
management (as VCG is typically computationally hard, and thus, not readily
scalable [7]).
A number of researchers have focused on mechanism design without money [21,6].
However, none of these mechanisms can be easily applied to the traffic assign-
ment problem, as they do not take into account the features of the underlying
traffic network structure. As we will show, TAP bears some resemblance to the
problem of assigning indivisible objects [4,25,11], although these results are not
directly applicable to our scenario. Indeed TAP has a much more complex struc-
ture (mainly due to the underlying traffic network topology) which traditional
assignment mechanisms fail to address.
3 Model and Preliminary Definitions
A traffic assignment problem (TAP) consists of a set of agents A = {a1, . . . , an}
and a road network infrastructure, represented as a directed graph G = (V,E),
where: (i) V = {v1, . . . , v|V |} is the set of nodes representing the junctions of
the road network infrastructure; and (ii) E ⊆ V × V is the set of directed
edges representing one-way road segments. Each edge e ∈ E has a capacity
c : E → N+, which determines the maximum number of agents that can travel
through the edge at any given time, and a weight function w : E → R+ which
represents the cost incurred by the agent traveling through the edge (i.e., travel
distance). Furthermore, each edge is associated to a transit time τ : E → Z+
which represents the free travel time of the edge (i.e., the minimum travel time
needed to travel through the road at maximum allowed speed). This means that
agent ai setting off at time t from node vo and heading to node vd through the
edge (vo, vd) will reach node vd at time t+τ(vo, vd), and will occupy edge (vo, vd)
only in the time interval [t, t+τ(vo, vd)]. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that
edges (u, v) and (v, u) are symmetrical : for all (u, v), (v, u) ∈ E c(u, v) = c(v, u),
w(u, v) = w(v, u) and τ(u, v) = τ(v, u).
As in [18], we assume that if the flow of traffic through an edge does not
exceed its capacity, then no congestion occurs and the traveling time equals the
free travel time. Initially, at time t = 0, agents reside on a (publicly known) set
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O ⊆ V of nodes6 of the graph, Oi being the initial location of agent ai. Each
agent ai ∈ A wants to reach an intended destination Di ∈ V , which is the agent’s
private information and will be referred to in the remainder as her type.
Agents submit (or bid) a destination to an allocation mechanism, which then
assigns each agent a path in order to optimize a certain objective function. More
formally, let P be the set of all possible simple paths between any two nodes in
G. Let D = (D1, . . . , Dn) ∈ V n be a vector of declarations (also referred to as
bids) by the agents and D−i be the vector of declarations of all agents but ai.
A mechanism MG,O : V n → Pn maps a vector of declarations to feasible paths
(i.e., not exceeding the capacity of the edges at any given time) on G, given
the initial locations O of the agents. We write M(D) instead of MG,O(D) when
G and O can be deduced from the context. The path associated to agent ai is
denoted as Mi(D).
A traffic assignment S = M(D) induces a flow over time7 fS : E×T → N+,
where T is a suitable discretization of time w.r.t. the transit times of the edges of
G (for simplicity we will assume that T = {0, 1, . . . , T}, where T is a time horizon
sufficient for the network to clear. Thus, fS(u, v; t) = |{ai ∈ A|(u, v) ∈ Si}| is
the number of agents that are assigned a path that contains edge (u, v) at time
t ∈ T . Feasibility constraints imply that fS(u, v; t) ≤ c(u, v) for all t ∈ T .
In the remainder, without loss of generality, we will study the problem on the
time-expanded network [12,13] of G and consider the static flow through it (i.e,
the transit of an agent over and edge is instantaneous). A time-expanded network
is a properly constructed directed graph with cost and capacity functions on the
edges just like G, but no transit time (i.e. travel time is instantaneous through all
the edges). For completeness, we give the definition of time expanded networks
in the Appendix. This is without loss of generality from the point of view of
SP, Pareto-optimality, non-bossines and approximation guarantee since it is well
known (see [12,13]) that a flow over time is equivalent to a static flow on the
corresponding time-expanded network.
Let f−iS : E → N be the flow induced by traffic assignment S generated by
agents A \ {ai}, formally for all e ∈ E, f−iS (e) = |{aj ∈ A : e ∈ Sj , j 6= i}|.
The residual graph G−if is a graph such that: (i) G
−i
f has the same nodes and
edges as G; (ii) each edge e ∈ E of G−if has capacity c(e) − f−iS (e). For any
two nodes u, v ∈ V , let Pu,v denote the set of simple paths in G connecting
u to v. Furthermore, for all traffic assignments S = M(D) and all agents ai,
let Piu,v(S) = {P ∈ Pu,v|∀e ∈ P, c(e) > f−iS (e)}. Informally, Piu,v(S) is the set
of paths connecting u and v that have spare capacity from the perspective of
6Restricting origins/destinations of journeys to road junctions is without loss of gen-
erality since fictitious nodes that serve the sole purpose of acting as starting/ending
point of a journey can always be created by edge splitting operations.
7Sometimes also referred to as dynamic flow in the literature. We prefer the term flow
over time as the adjective dynamic has often been used in many algorithmic settings
to refer to problems where the input data arrive online or change over time. We assume
that all the agents are present at time t = 0 and the network is cleared after the last
agent reaches their destination.
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agent ai (i.e., they can be used by agent ai) when the other agents implement
S. Then, the set of reactions available to agent ai having type Di at allocation
S is defined as Ri(S) = PiOi,Di(S).
Agents are not constrained to follow their assigned path but can choose a
different one, subject to capacity constraints8. To model this, as per [19], we
assume that, after the mechanism computes a traffic allocation, the agents can
react by choosing an action from a set Ri ⊆ P. Hence, the actual cost function
of an agent depends on: (i) her true type Di; (ii) the allocation S chosen by
the mechanism on input the bids reported by the agents; and (iii) the reactions
chosen by the agents.
We can now formally define the cost function of an agent. Given an allocation
S′ = M(D′i,D−i), the cost of an agent of type Di with respect to S
′ is defined
as: costi(S
′, Di) = minP∈Ri(S′) w(P ) where w(P ) =
∑
(u,v)∈P w(u, v) denotes
the cost of P . We assume that agents are risk-neutral. In what follows, we define
a set of desiderata for our allocation mechanism, namely: (i) strategyproofness,
(ii) Pareto optimality and (iii) non-bossiness.
A deterministic mechanism M is strategyproof (SP for short) if, for all agents
ai, for all declarations Di and D
′
i and all declarations of the other agents D−i,
agent ai cannot decrease her cost by misreporting her true type, namely:
costi(M(D), Di) ≤ costi(M(D′i,D−i), Di) (1)
A randomized mechanism is strategyproof in expectation if (1) holds in expecta-
tion (i.e., over the random choices of the mechanism). A randomized mechanism
is universally strategyproof if agents cannot gain by lying regardless of the ran-
dom choices made by the mechanism, i.e., the output of the mechanism is a
distribution over strategyproof deterministic allocations.
The social cost of an allocation S is defined as SC(S,D) =
∑
ai∈A costi(S,Di).
A mechanism OPT is optimal for TAP if OPT (D) ∈ arg minS∈Pn SC(S,D) for
all D. A mechanism M is an α–approximation (w.r.t the optimal social cost)
with α ∈ R, α ≥ 1, being referred to as the approximation ratio of M , if, for all
D, SC(M(D),D) ≤ α · SC(OPT (D),D).
A traffic allocation S ∈ Pn is Pareto optimal if there exists no other fea-
sible traffic allocation S′ such that costj(S′, Dj) ≤ costj(S,Dj) for all aj , and
costk(S
′, Dk) < costk(S,Dk) for some ak. Pareto optimal allocations are of par-
ticular interest in our scenario, because, as proven in Theorem 1, they are a
min-cost response in the available reactions Ri(S) of an agent. This gives us a
theoretical guarantee that agents will actually implement Pareto optimal solu-
tions returned by the mechanism.
8We do not prevent agents from using edges other than the ones belonging to their
assigned paths, as doing so would result in a waste of public resources (i.e., road
capacity). To avoid congestion, though, we assume that agents not following their
assigned route can be disincentivized from using an edge that, according to the sched-
uled traffic, is filled to capacity. This can be easily implemented in a smart traffic
control system through the use of traffic cameras that check cars’ number plates.
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Theorem 1. Let S = M(D) be a traffic assignment and let Ri(S) be the
set of reactions available to ai at S. If S is Pareto optimal, then Mi(D) ∈
arg minP∈Ri(S) w(P ).
Finally, a mechanism M is non-bossy if Mi(D) = Mi(D
′
i,D−i) implies that
Mj(D) = Mj(D
′
i,D−i), for all ai, aj ∈ N and all D and D′i. In other words,
non-bossyness excludes (arguably undesirable) mechanisms that allow one agent
to change the allocation of other agents without changing her own too. In the
remainder of this paper, we focus on strategyproof mechanisms for TAP that
approximately achieve the optimal social cost. In particular, we are interested
in mechanisms that are also Pareto-optimal and non-bossy.
4 Deterministic Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss deterministic mechanisms for TAP. In particular,
we first provide a lower bound on the approximation ratio of SP deterministic
mechanisms.
Theorem 2. There is no α-approximate deterministic SP mechanism for the
traffic assignment problem with α < 3− ε, for any ε > 0.
The above theorem implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The optimal allocation is not strategyproof for TAP.
These impossibility results suggest that in order to achieve strategyproofness
we have to give up on optimality. This naturally leads to asking to what extent
can we approximate the optimal social welfare while satisfy the desired proper-
ties. As a first step to answer this question, we examine the well-known Serial
Dictatorship mechanism that is deterministic and notoriously satisfies our three
desiderata (i.e., strategyproofness, Pareto optimality and non-bossiness).
Definition 1. Mechanism Serial Dictatorship (SD), given an ordering a1 ≺
, . . . ,≺ an of the agents, allocates paths to agents in n stages such that at stage i
agent ai is allocated her minimum cost path in the residual graph G
−{a1,...,ai−1}
f .
The following theorem proves that SD is indeed feasible under some mild
conditions:
Theorem 3. If G is K-edge-connected9, mechanism SD is feasible for K agents.
Next we provide an upper bound on the approximation ratio of SD, and
thus, on its worst case performance. In order to prove our result, we make the
following assumption:
9A graph is K-edge-connected if it remains connected when strictly fewer than K edges
are removed.
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Definition 2. The deviation on capacious path assumption (DoCP) assumes
that whenever the SD mechanism allocates to an agent a path that is different
from the one that the optimal mechanism would allocate, the assigned path has
sufficient capacity to potentially be allocated to all the remaining agents.
To better understand this assumption, consider the following example. With
reference to Figure 1, let ai be an agent and P
∗
i be the path she is assigned in
the optimal allocation (i.e., OPTi = P
∗
i ). If agent ai is not assigned P
∗
i by SD,
there must be an agent aj , where j ≺ i in the ordering used by SD, such that:
(i) SDj = Pj 6= OPTj and (ii) Pj ∩ P ∗i 6= ∅ and (iii) at least one edge of P ∗i
is saturated after aj is assigned Pj . In such a situation, we say that agent ai is
blocked by agent aj . Let αi ∈ Pj ∩ P ∗i (βi ∈ Pj ∩ P ∗i , respectively) be the first
(last, respectively) node of P ∗i in Pj . The DoCP assumption postulates that if
aj blocks ai, then the alternative path of blocked agent ai through blocking agent
aj Γ
j
i = (Oi, αi, Oj , Dj , βi, Di) has at least capacity n − |{ak ∈ A|aj ≺ ak}| in
the residual graph G
−{a1,...,aj}
f . That is, all agents yet to be assigned by SD after
aj can be accommodated on this path. We note that, by construction, if agent
ai is blocked by agent aj then path Γ
j
i always exists, although unless we assume
DoCP, it might not have spare capacity to be assigned to agent ai. It is not
Fig. 1. Deviation on capacious paths
difficult to see that if we relax the DoCP assumption, then the approximation
ratio of SD is not bounded by any function of the number of agents on certain
pathological TAP instances.
Theorem 4. Under the DoCP assumption, SD is at most (2n−1)-approximate.
Proof (Proof sketch). We prove the claim by induction on the number of players.
Let OPTi denote the cost and solution (with a slight abuse of notation) of the
optimal allocation that only considers bids of agents j ≤ i. Similarly, let SDi
denote the cost and solution of SD on input all the bids of agents j ≤ i. Base of
the induction (i = 1): trivially OPT1 = SD1. Now assume that the claim is true
for i− 1 and, for j ≤ i, let P ∗j (Pj , respectively) be the path assigned to agent j
by OPTi (SDi, respectively). For a path P , we let w(P ) denote the cost of the
path in the given graph G. We want to prove that under the DoCP assumption,
the following holds:
w(Pi) ≤ OPTi + SDi−1. (2)
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If P ∗i = Pi then we are done. Therefore, we can assume that P
∗
i 6= Pi. This
means that the paths Pj allocated to agents j < i by SDi saturate some of the
edges of P ∗i . Now, for at least one of these agents, say j¯, P
∗¯
j
6= Pj¯ for otherwise
also in OPTi path P
∗
i would be unavailable to i. But then w(Pi) ≤ w(Γ j¯i ), Γ j¯i
being the path that connects Oi to Di through Oj¯ , as per the definition of DoCP.
Note that, under the DoCP assumption, Γ j¯i is always feasible. Since Γ
j¯
i uses only
edges in OPTi ∪SDi−1 (i.e. P ∗i and P ∗j are in OPTi, paths (Oi, αi) and (βi, Dj)
belong to SDi−1), (2) is proven. We finally observe that (2) and the inductive
hypothesis yield:
SDi = SDi−1 + w(Γ
j¯
i ) ≤ 2SDi−1 +OPTi
≤ 2((2i−1 − 1)OPTi−1) +OPTi ≤ (2i − 1)OPTi.
As the (2n−1)-approximation ratio can be prohibitively large for large n, we
ask ourselves whether we can further improve this upper bound. Unfortunately,
the following theorem answers this question in the negative.
Theorem 5. Under the DoCP assumption, the bound of Theorem 4 is tight.
We now provide a characterization of SP, Pareto-optimal, and non-bossy
mechanisms for a subset of instances of TAP, named TAP+ and we prove that
the family of all mechanisms satisfying the above properties is comprised by a
generalization of SD, namely Bi-polar Serial Dictatorship (BSD). Such a char-
acterization extends naturally to TAP instances. TAP+ is subset of instances
of TAP having a peculiar structure: (i) every agent has the same source node
O; (ii) O has outgoing edges with unitary capacity and no ingoing edges, let
EO = {(O, v1), . . . , (O, vm)} denote the set of outgoing edges of O; and (iii) the
set of possible destinations that the agents can declare is restricted to a given
subset D ⊂ V .
Definition 3. Given an ordering of the agents {i1, i2} ≺ i3 ≺ . . . ≺ in and a
bipartition {X1, X2} of the set of alternatives X (i.e., paths in the case of TAP)
such that X1 ∩X2 = ∅ and X1 ∪X2 = X, a BSD mechanism executes SD with
ordering i2 ≺ i1 ≺ . . . ≺ in if minx∈X cost1(x) = minx∈X cost2(x) = x ∈ X2;
otherwise SD with ordering i1 ≺ i2 ≺ . . . ≺ in is executed.
Theorem 6. A traffic allocation mechanism for TAP+is Pareto-optimal, SP
and non-bossy if and only if it is a Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rule.
Proof (Proof sketch). We reduce an instance of the problem of assigning indivis-
ible objects with general ordinal preferences [4] (AIO for short) to TAP+. In an
instance of AIO, a set of objects X = {x1, . . . , xm} has to be assigned to a set
of agents A = {a1, . . . , an}, such that every agent receives at most one object
and no agent is left without an object if there are objects still available. Agents
have ordinal general preferences i, where x i y for x, y ∈ X means that agent
i (weakly) prefers object x to object y. From an instance of AIO, we build an
instance of TAP+ as follows. TAP+ has the same set of agents A as AIO. Graph
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G of TAP+ has a node O such that Oi = O for all ai ∈ A. For every object
xj ∈ X we construct in G a node vj and an edge (O, vj) such that c(O, vj) = 1
and w(O, vj) = ε for 0 < ε  1. Let Ψ be the set of all possible preference re-
lations over X. We construct |Ψ | destination nodes Dk, one for each preference
relation ∈ Ψ and for each k ∈ 1, . . . , |Ψ |. For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we add an
edge (vj , Dk) having capacity 1 and weight w(vj , Dk) equal to the ranking of xj
according to . We can now transform an instance of the so-constructed TAP+
problem to an instance of the AIO problem, and vice versa. In [4] it is proved
that BSD is the only Pareto optimal, SP and non-bossy mechanism for AIO.
This characterization transfers to TAP+ due to the reduction sketched above.
Next, we investigate the performance of BSD and show that it does not
asymptotically perform better than SD. In particular, we state that:
Lemma 1. BSD cannot achieve an approximation ratio lower than Ω(2n) for
TAP.
5 Randomized Mechanisms
Given the undesirable approximation guarantees of deterministic mechanisms,
we now turn to randomization. Randomized mechanisms can often be interpreted
as fractional mechanisms for the deterministic solutions, under mild conditions.
We start by proving the following inapproximability lower bound:
Theorem 7. There is no α-approximate universally truthful randomized mech-
anism for the traffic assignment problem with α < 11/10.
In the remainder of this section, we study the randomized version of SD for
TAP, which is universally strategyproof, (ex-post) Pareto optimal and non-bossy.
Definition 4. The Randomized Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism computes
uniformly at random an ordering σ over the agents and returns the output of SD
over ordering σ.
The following results gives a tight bound on the approximation ratio of RSD.
Theorem 8. Under the DoCP assumption, RSD is at most n-approximate.
Proof (Proof sketch). We are going to prove the claim by induction on the num-
ber of agents. As above, let OPTi denote the cost of the optimal solution with
paths assigned only to agents aj , with j ≤ i. With a slight abuse of notation we
also let OPTi denote the solution itself. Similarly, RSDi denotes the expected
cost of RSD on input all the bids of agents aj , j ≤ i. For the base of the induc-
tion with i = 1, it is clear that RSD1 is the optimal solution. Now assume that
the claim is true for i − 1 and consider an instance with i agents. Let I−k(P ),
P being a path from Ok to Dk, be the instance of the problem without agent
ak and with the capacity of the directed edges in P diminished by one (i.e., as
if the path P were used by ak). Note that by the DoCP assumption, one of the
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agents aj , with j 6= k, is guaranteed to be able to use the edges of P in the
opposite direction than ak. We now let OPT−k,P and RSD−k,P be the cost of
the optimum and expected cost of RSD on I−k(P ), respectively. Moreover, let
pij be the path minimizing the cost of agent aj (i.e., the path that SD would
assign to aj if she was the first to choose). We then have
RSDi =
1
i
i∑
k=1
(
w(pik) + RSD−k,pik
)
≤ 1
i
i∑
k=1
(
w(pik) + (i− 1)OPT−k,pik
)
≤ 1
i
i∑
k=1
w(pik) +
1
i
i∑
k=1
(
(i− 1)(OPTi + w(pik))
)
≤ 1
i
OPTi + (i− 1)OPTi +
i− 1
i
OPTi
= i ·OPTi
where the first equality follows from the definition of RSD, i.e., with probability
1/i each agent k will have the first choice. As for the inequalities, we note that the
first follows from the inductive hypothesis whilst the last from the observation
that OPTi ≥
∑i
k=1 w(pik). We are left with the second inequality. That is, we
prove that under the DoCP OPT−k,pik ≤ OPTi+w(pik). If OPTi allocates pik to
agent ak then we are done. Otherwise, let Pk be the path that ak gets in OPTi
and note that the paths Pj allocated to agents aj j 6= k by OPTi saturates
some of the edges of Pk; let aj¯ be one of these agents. Consider now the solution
S to I−k(pik) where all agents but aj¯ are allocated the same path as in OPTi
and agent aj¯ is given, instead of Pj¯ , the alternative path Γ
k
j¯
through agent ak.
Observe that Γ k
j¯
uses the same directed edges of Pj¯ and Pk and the edges of
pik in opposite direction and, as observed above, under the DoCP assumption,
is a feasible path for aj¯ and S a feasible solution to Ik(pik), whose social cost is
denoted SC(S). But then:
OPT−k,pik ≤ SC(S) = OPTi − w(Pj)− w(Pk) + w(P ) ≤ OPTi + w(pik)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the edges in P \ (Pk ∪ Pj)
are a subset of the edges in pik.
Theorem 9. The approximation ratio of RSD is Ω(n).
This means that by allowing randomness in the allocation mechanism, we can
improve the exponential approximation ratio of the deterministic case to a linear
one.
Fig. 2. Experimental results on Rome99
Rome-99 NY-4000 NY-10000
|V | 3000 4000 10000
|E| 8859 10027 312594
δ+AVG 2.6 2.5 31
cAVG 27.3 20.5 30
Fig. 3. Structural characteristics of test
graphs
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Fig. 4. Experimental results on NY-4000 Fig. 5. Experimental results on NY-10000
6 Experimental Results
In this section we present the results of the experimental evaluation we conducted
in order to assess whether the theoretical inapproximability lower bounds impose
a high approximation cost on real-life instances. In short, we will show that they
do not. In particular, we have measured the approximation ratio obtained by
SD and RSD on three real-life graphs extracted from the DIMCAS 99 shortest
path implementation challenge benchmark datasets [1]. In particular, Rome99
represents a large portion of the directed road network of the city of Rome, Italy,
from 1999. The graph contains 3353 vertices and 8870 edges. Vertices correspond
to intersections between roads and edges correspond to roads or road segments.
NY-4000 and NY-10000 are two subgraphs extracted from NY-d, a larger dis-
tance graph (with 264,346 nodes and 733,846 edges) representing a large portion
the road network infrastrucutre of New York City, USA. The two graphs were
obtained by taking a subset, respectively, of the first 4000 and 10000 nodes of
the graph while ensuring that the connectivity was preserved by adding edges
representing paths through nodes of the original graph not included in the sub-
graph. In Table 3 some statistics related to the structural characteristics of our
test graphs are reported, where δ+AVG represents the average outdegree of a node
(i.e. the average number of edges originating from a node) and cAVG is the av-
erage capacity of the outgoing edges of a node. In our experimental assessment,
we studied the variation of the approximation ratio of SD and RSD on the test
graphs while varying the resource augmentation factor. The resource augmenta-
tion factor is the key parameter of the resource augmentation framework [6], a
novel comparison framework where a truthful mechanism that allocates “scarce
resources” is evaluated by its worst-case performance on an instance where such
“scarce resources” are augmented, against the optimal mechanism on the same
instance with the original amount of resources. In [6] it is argued that this is
a fairer comparison framework than the traditional approximation ratio, which
compares the performance of a mechanism that is severely limited by the require-
ment of truthfulness to that of an omnipotent mechanism that operates under no
restrictions and has access to the real inputs of the agents. An equivalent resource
augmentation framework is often also used in the analysis of online algorithms.
In the TAP scenario, the natural resource to be augmented is the capacity of the
existing edges, modelled by the augmentation factor γ, which in our framework
is defined as the factor by which the average capacity of the edges departing from
a node is multiplied, spreading the excess capacity evenly among the outgoing
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edges of the node. More formally, if cAVG(v) is the average capacity of node v,
then the augmented average capacity cγAV G(v) = γ · cAVG, and the capacity of
each outgoing edge is set as cAVG(v)δ+(v) , where δ
+(v) is the outdegree of v. In our
experiments we ranged the augmentation factor γ in the interval [1, 2], which
means increasing the initial capacity until it is doubled. To run our experiments,
we generated three separate populations of agent-origin-destination triplets, one
population for each test graph, each comprising a number of triplets roughly
equal to 1/3 of the nodes of the graph. The size of the population of triplets was
empirically tailored to let the competition for popular links arise without mak-
ing the allocation problem unfeasible. For each agent-origin-destination triplet
in the population, both the origin and the destination were independently drawn
uniformly at random from the set of the nodes of the graph, with replacement
(i.e. the same node can be the origin/destination of multiple triplets).
Figures 2, 4 and 5 show the results of our experimental analysis, respectively
on graph Rome99, NY-4000 and NY-10000. In particular, the left hand side plot
represents the absolute value of the social cost for the optimal mechanism, ex-
pressed in kilometers, for SD and for RSD, whereas the right hand side plot
represents the approximation ratio for SD and RSD. From our experimental
analysis we can see that the actual approximation ratio of both SD and RSD is
much lower than the predicted theoretical worst-case approximation. In partic-
ular, our experiments show that the approximation ratios of SD and RSD are
quite similar and strongly o(n) on the investigated road networks. This is due to
the fact that such theoretical approximation lower bounds rely on pathological
instances that are quite unlikely to occur in real life graphs. It is also worth not-
ing the beneficial effect that augmenting the capacity of existing roads has on
the approximation ratio: increasing the augmentation factor steadily decreases
the approximation ratio on both Rome99 and NY-4000. On the other hand a
marked decrease is noticeable only if we increase the augmentation factor to 1.8
in the case of NY-10000. This phenomenon is due to the already reach topolog-
ical structure of NY-10000, which necessitates less augmentation to yield good
performances.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the problem of strategyproof traffic assignment
without monetary incentives. We study two SP mechanism for our problem,
namely Serial Dictatorship and its randomized counterpart Random Serial Dic-
tatorships. For deterministic mechanisms we prove that Serial Dictatorship is
2n − 1 under some mild assumptions, and characterize Bipolar Serial Dictator-
ship as the only SP, Pareto optimal and non-bossy deterministic mechanism for
our problem. In the randomized case, we prove that Random Serial Dictator-
ship is n-approximate. Finally we assess the performance of Serial Dictatorship
and Random Serial Dictatorship on real road network infrastructure, and show
that they exhibit good approximation guarantees. In particular, RSD is almost
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indistinguishable from SD, which means that the instances giving rise to the
inapproximability results rarely occur in practice.
Note that our work is the first that addresses the problem of moneyless
strategyproof traffic assignment. Although it ignores a number of properties that
occur in real-world scenarios (e.g., dynamic network behavior, or asynchronous
bid submissions), it still serves as a proof of concept for the existence of moneyless
strategyproof assignment mechanisms.
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A Appendix
In the following we give the proofs of the theorems that were omitted in the
main body of the paper due to space limitations.
A.1 Time-Expanded Networks
Let G = (V,E) be a network with capacities c, non-negative integral transit
times τ , and costs w on the edges. For a given time horizon T ∈ Z > 0, the
corresponding time-expanded network GT = (V T , ET ) with capacities and costs
on the edges is defined as follows. For each node v ∈ V there are T copies
v0, v1, . . . , vT−1, that is, V T = {vt|v ∈ V, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}} . For each edge
e = (v, w) ∈ E, there are T − τ(e) copies e0, e1, . . . , eT−1−τ(e) where edge et
connects node vt to node wt+τ(e) . Edge et has capacity c(et) = c(e) and cost
w(et) = w(e). Moreover, ET contains holdover edges (vt, vt+1) for v ∈ V and
t = 0, . . . , T − 2. The capacity of holdover edges is infinite and they have zero
cost.
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A.2 Omitted Theorems
Theorem 10. Let S = M(D) be a traffic assignment and let Ri(S) be the
set of reaction available to ai at S. If S is Pareto optimal, then Mi(D) ∈
arg minP∈Ri(S) w(P ).
Proof. If Mi(D) /∈ arg minP∈Ri(S) w(P ), then there must exist a reaction r′i ∈ Ri
that is strictly better than Mi(D) for agent ai, i.e. c(r
′
i) < c(Mi(D)). Then, a
route assignment M ′ such that M ′j = Mj for all j 6= i and M ′i = ri is still
feasible. Since costj(M
′) = costj(M ′) for all j 6= i, and costi(M ′) < costi(M),
M is not Pareto optimal.
Theorem 11. There is no α-approximate deterministic SP mechanism for the
traffic assignment problem with α < 3− ε, for any ε > 0.
Proof. Given ε > 0, consider the graph depicted in Figure 6, where the labels
on the edges represent their capacity (red) and length (black). The instance we
consider has two agents A = {a1, a2}, both initially located at node A, whose
intended destination is D and G, respectively (namely, D = (D,G)). The length
of the path (B,C) is K = min{2, 10−4εε } and the length of path (F,E) is K − 1.
Let us consider a generic α-approximate mechanism M . Assume by contradiction
Fig. 6. Lower bound instance
that M is strategyproof and α-approximate with α < 3−ε. The instance has two
Pareto optimal solutions, depending on which player is allocated the edge (A,F )
(note that only one agent at a time can use edge (A,F ) as its capacity is 1). The
optimal allocation P∗ = OPT (D) is P ∗1 = (A,B,C,D) and P
∗
2 = (A,F,E,G),
cost1(P
∗, D) = K + 2 and cost2(P∗, G) = K + 1, and SC(P∗,D) = 2K + 3.
The second best solution is P1 = (A,F,E,D) and P2 = (A,B,C,E,G). We
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note that cost1(P1, D1) = K + 1 and cost2(P2, D2) = K + 3, for a social cost of
SC(M(D),D) = 2K + 4. We are going to prove that, regardless of the solution
M returns on this instance, there is another instance where to maintain SP, M
achieves an approximation not better than 3− ε, a contradiction. Let us assume
first that M returns the optimal allocation. If agent a1 declares D
′
1 = F instead
of her true type, by SP, M cannot allocate the edge (A,F ) to a1. In fact, assume
for the sake of contradiction that M(D′1, D2) allocates (A,F ) to a1. Then a2 is
allocated path (A,B,C,E,G) and a1 can use path (A,F,E,D) and reach her
true destination, thus having:
cost1(M(D
′
1, D2), D1) = K + 1 < cost1(M(D), D1) = K + 2.
Therefore, M(D′1, D2) must return P
′
1 = (A,B,C,E, F ) and P
′
2 = (A,F,E,G),
with SC((P ′1, P
′
2), (D
′
1, D2)) = 3K + 2, whilst the optimum for this instance
is OPT1(D
′
1, D2) = (A,F ) and OPT2(D
′
1, D2) = (A,B,C,E,G). The social
cost of the optimum is then SC(OPT (D′1, D2), (D
′
1, D2)) = K + 4. There-
fore M has an approximation ratio higher than 3 − ε. Let us now suppose
that M(D) returns M1(D) = P1 and M2(D) = P2. In this case, consider the
case that agent a2 reports D
′
2 = F instead of her true type. The optimal al-
location is OPT1(D1, D
′
2) = (A,B,C,D) and OPT2(D1, D
′
2) = (A,F ), and
SC(OPT (D′2, D1), (D
′
2, D1)) = K + 3. As before, this allocation is not strat-
egyproof as:
cost2(OPT2(D1, D
′
2), D2) = K + 1
< cost2(M2(D1, D
′
2), D2) = K + 3
(i.e., agent a2 can use the route (A,F,E,G) to reach her true destination). As
above, one can easily check that in this case the best (in terms of approximation
ratio) strategyproof allocation is P ′1 = (A,F,E,D) and P
′
2 = (A,B,C,E, F ),
with a cost of SC((P ′1, P
′
2), (D1, D
′
2)) = 3K + 2. This solution has an approxi-
mation ratio higher than 3− ε.
Theorem 12. If G is K-edge-connected10, mechanism Serial Dictator is feasible
for K agents.
Proof. If the graph is K-edge connected, the allocation returned by the Serial
Dictator will always be feasible, (i.e. paths assigned to different agents will not
overlap and there is always an assignable path for each agents). This follows from
the fact that in aK-edge-connected graph there are at leastK edge disjoint paths
between any pair of nodes.
Theorem 5. Under the DoCP assumption, the bound of Theorem 4 is tight.
Proof. Let us consider the instance in Figure 7, where there are n nodes v1, . . . , vn
and n agents A = {a1, . . . , an} such that agent ai is initially located at node
10A graph is K-edge-connected if removing at most K edges from it does not disconnect
the graph.
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vi. All agents want to reach the same destination D. Each link has capacity 1.
Agent a1 has two paths to her destination D: one direct path that costs 1 + ε
(where ε  1 is a small constant) and a path costing 1 that goes through the
node agent a2 is initially located on. Each agent ai, for i = 2, . . . , n− 1 has two
paths: one direct path that costs ε and a path costing 2i−1 that goes through the
node agent ai+1 is initially located on. Agent an has two direct paths, costing
ε and 2n−1 respectively. The optimal traffic assignment assigns agent a1 to the
path that costs 1 + ε and the other agents to the path costing ε, and has a
cost of 1 + εn. Let us consider ordering a1 ≺ a2 ≺ . . . ≺ an. On this ordering,
mechanism SD assigns agent a1 the path costing 1, and to each agent ai, for
i = 2, . . . , an the path costing 2
i−1 for a total cost of
∑n−1
i=0 2
i = 2n − 1. For ε
close to 0, the approximation ratio of SD on the instance depicted in Figure 7 is
hence close to 2n − 1.
Fig. 7. Tight instance for SD
Theorem 6. A traffic allocation mechanism for TAP+is Pareto-optimal, SP
and non-bossy if and only if it is a Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rule.
Proof. We will reduce an instance of the problem of assigning indivisible objects
with general ordinal preferences [4] (AIO for short) to TAP+. An instance of
AIO is composed of a set of objects X = {x1, . . . , xm} that have to be assigned
to a set of agents A = {a1, . . . , an}, such that every agent receives at most one
object and no agent is left without an object if there are objects still available.
Agents have ordinal general preferences i, where x i y for x, y ∈ X means
that agent i (weakly) prefers object x to object y. From an instance of AIO,
we can build an instance of TAP+ as follows. TAP+ has the same set of agents
A as AIO. Graph G of TAP+ has a node O such that Oi = O for all ai ∈ A.
For every object xj ∈ X we construct in G a node vj and an edge (O, vj) such
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that c(O, vj) = 1 and w(O, vj) = ε for 0 < ε  1. Let Ψ be the set of all
possible preference relations over X. We construct11 |Ψ | destination nodes Dk,
one for each preference relation ∈ Ψ and for each k ∈ 1, . . . , |Ψ |. For each
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we add an edge (vj , Dk) having capacity 1 and weight w(vj , Dk)
equal to the ranking12 of xj according to . Figure 8 gives an example of the
reduction applied to an AIO game with A = {a1, a2, a3}, X = {x1, x2, x3} and
Ψ being the set of all possible linear orderings over X. The labels on the edges
of the graph of Figure 8 represent the costs of the edges, whereas all capacities
are set to 1.
Table 1. Mapping elements of Ψ to destination nodes of G
D1 x1 ≺ x2 ≺ x3
D2 x1 ≺ x3 ≺ x2
D3 x2 ≺ x1 ≺ x3
D4 x2 ≺ x3 ≺ x1
D5 x3 ≺ x1 ≺ x2
D6 x3 ≺ x2 ≺ x1
By construction, the following hold: (i) any path allocation onGmust include
all the edges (O, vj); (ii) any edge (O, vj) is used by at most one path; and
(iii) only one agent can be assigned any given edge (O, vj) due to the capacity
constraint. We can now easily transform a path allocation for the so-constructed
TAP+ problem to an allocation of objects to agents in the AIO problem, and
vice versa. Indeed, let Pi be the path assigned to agent ai in the TAP
+ problem.
If Pi contains edge (O, vj) we allocate object xj to agent ai in the AIO instance,
and vice versa from an allocation for the AOI problem to an allocation for the
TAP+ problem. In [4] it is proved that BSD is the only Pareto optimal, SP and
non-bossy mechanism for AIO. This characterization trivially transfers to TAP+
due to the reduction sketched above. Indeed, let us suppose that there exists an
SP, Pareto optimal and non-bossy algorithm for TAP. Such algorithm would be
SP, Pareto optimal and non-bossy for the AIO instance as well.
Lemma 2. BSD cannot achieve an approximation ratio lower than Ω(2n) for
TAP.
Proof. We are going to show an instance of TAP where BSD has an approxi-
mation ratio of Ω(2n). Let us take the instance of Figure 7 and let us consider
11We note that, although |Ψ | can be exponential in m, it is always finite. We remark
that graphs of exponential size are not an issue here since the characterization we
are proving in this theorem does not rely on computational efficiency.
12The alternatives in X can be partitioned in subsets X1, . . . , X`, . . . such that any
two elements x1, x2 ∈ X` are indifferent according to  and, for any x1 ∈ X` and
x2 ∈ X`+1, x1 is strictly preferred to x2 according to . Then ` is the ranking of
x ∈ X`.
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Fig. 8. Reduction example
the ordering {a1, a2} ≺ a3 ≺ . . . ≺ an. Let us consider X1 = {v2, D} and
X2 = E \ X1. The so-defined BSD mechanism, on input the instance of figure
7 would always execute SD with ordering a1 ≺ a2 ≺ . . . , an. We know from
Theorem 5 that under this ordering the approximation ratio of SD is Ω(2n).
Theorem 7. There is no α-approximate randomized universally truthful mech-
anism for the traffic assignment problem with α < 11/10.
Proof. Our approach is based on Yao’s minimax principle [27]. In our context,
this principle states that the approximation ratio of the best universally truthful
randomized mechanism is equal to the approximation ratio of the best determin-
istic truthful mechanism under a worst-case input distribution. Accordingly, we
exhibit a probability distribution over input instances for which any determin-
istic truthful mechanism cannot attain an approximation guarantee better than
11/10. The two instances are taken from the proof of Theorem 11, where we set
K = 2. Specifically, we consider the instance in Figure 6, that we name I, and
the very same instance where agent a1 reports F ; we call this instance I
′. We
consider a probability distribution over I and I ′ that returns I with probability
λ and I ′ with the remaining probability 1 − λ, where λ = 2/3. The expected
value of the optimum will then be (λ+1)K+4−λ = 20/3. Let M be a SP deter-
ministic mechanism. From the arguments in the proof of the theorem above, we
know that M must assign the edge (A,F ) to the same agent in both instances I
and I ′. If M allocates (A,F ) to agent a1 in both the instances then its expected
social cost will be (λ + 1)K + 4 = 22/3 for an approximation ratio of 11/10. If
instead M allocates (A,F ) to agent a2 in both the instances then the expected
social cost of the mechanism will be (3−λ)K+λ+2 = 22/3; the approximation
ratio of M would then be 11/10.
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Theorem 9. The approximation ratio of RSD is Ω(n).
Proof. The proof uses the same construction as the instance of Figure 7, with
k < n nodes. One agent is initially located at node v1, whereas 1 + 2 · 3i−1
agents are initially located at node vi, for i = 2, . . . , k − 1 . With a little abuse
of notation, let |vi| denote the number of agents initially located at node vi, and
let ni =
∑i
`=0 |v`|. Edges (v1, D) and (v1, v2) have capacity 1, whereas edges
(vi, D) and (vi, vi+1) have capacity 1 + 2 · 3i−1 for i > 1. Let a1 ≺ . . . ≺ an
be an ordering over the agents. We will be interested in orderings that possess
the chain of levels property, namely for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 at least one agent
located at node i appears after all agents of levels 0, 1, . . . i − 1. The property
of a chain of levels ordering with respect to the instance of Figure 7 is that it
forces at least one agent located at node vi, for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1 to use the
path P = (vi, vi+1, D), at a cost of 2
i−1 for the agents, and an overall social cost
of
∑k−1
i=1 2
i−1 = 2k − 1 > 2k−1.
We argue that the probability that a chain of levels ordering is chosen by RSD
is Πk−1i=1
(
1− ni−1ni
)
. Indeed, we can look at the process of randomly generating
an ordering as follows. First an ordering for the agents located at each node is
uniformly generated at random. Then orderings of agents of consecutive nodes
are merged together in lexicographic order. In particular, we start merging the
orderings of nodes v1 and v2. There are
(|v2|+|v1|
v1
)
=
(
n2
n1
)
such orderings, whereas
there are
(
n2−1
n1
)
orderings where one agent located at node v2 follows all the
agents located at node v1. The partial ordering obtained so far is randomly
merged with the ordering of agents at node v3 and the procedure continues
until the partial ordering is complete. When merging agents at node vi with the
current partial ordering, we note that there are
(
ni
ni−1
)
possible orderings, and(
ni−1
ni−1
)
where for all ` = 1, . . . , i, one agent located at node v` follows all the
agents located at node v`−1 in the ordering (i.e., fix one agent from node v` in
the last position and compute all possible orderings of the other agents). Hence,
the probability of one agent at node v` appearing after all agents at node v`−1
is
(
ni−1
ni−1
)
/
(
ni
ni−1
)
=
(
1− ni−1ni
)
. Since the random orderings generated at each
stage are independent, the probability that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k− 1 at least one
agent at node vi appears after all agents at node vi−1 in a random ordering is
Πk−1i=1
(
1− ni−1ni
)
. Hence, the probability that a chain of levels ordering is chosen
by RSD for the instance of Figure 7 is (2/3)k−1.
Finally, the expected cost of RSD is at least (4/3)k−1 = nlog3(4/3) ≈ n0.262.
Since the optimal allocation costs 1 +  · n, the approximation ratio is Ω(n) for
 close to 0.
